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ON THE FORMALIST ACCOUNT OF AN ARBITRARY
FIRST-ORDER THEORY
STEPHEN BOYCE
Abstract. This paper examines the metatheory of the formalist account of an
arbitrary first-order theory. The paper considers whether the metatheory can
be expressed (using Tarskian semantics) in a model of a first-order theory that,
roughly speaking, contains a proper axiom (schema) corresponding to a set-
theoretic axiom (schema) of subsets. The hypothesis is reduced to absurdity.
1. The informal semantic metatheory of first-order logic
This paper examines the formalist account for first-order logic and first-order
theories more generally. For brevity, I characterise the formalist account as the
view that the formation and inference rules of first-order theories generally (in-
cluding the various predicate calculi) may be described in purely syntactical terms.
That is, the formation and inference rules may be described in statements that refer
only to uninterpreted primitive symbols, sequences of such symbols, sequences of
sequences such symbols and so on; clearly this does not imply, of itself, that the
collection of theorems of such systems may be characterised in purely syntactical
terms. In discussing first-order logic below I have in mind Mendelson’s [6] presen-
tation, though may aim is to exploit only features of this account shared by any
orthodox presentation. In brief then I consider in this paper whether the metathe-
ory of first-order logic, viewed as a collection of propositions, is expressed in a model
of any first-order theory, which, roughly speaking, contains an axiom schema that
corresponds to an axiom schema of subsets. A precise definition of the intended
class of first-order theories is presented below, however I will firstly present a more
precise definition of the notion of an arbitrary first-order theory (adapting [4] and
[6]).
Definition 1. The arbitrary first-order theory K shall be a definite but unspecified
value of the following function φ; for L a first-order language (see e.g. [6]§2.2)
and κ a possible empty set of L well-formed formulas (the proper axioms of K), the
value of φ(L, κ) shall be the smallest set that: includes every formula in κ and every
well-formed L formula that is a first-order logical truth, that is closed with respect
to the relation of C following from A and B by either the rule of modus ponens or
generalisation.
In the discussion that follows, I take the following five key propositions to form
part of the informal semantic metatheory of an arbitrary first-order theory.
Proposition 1. If K is any first-order theory then by the formalist account of
first-order logic the following metatheoretical sentences express true propositions
[6]:
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Soundness: The L formulas in K (the K theorems) are all true under every
interpretation of L that is a model of K;
Consistency: If B (any L formula) is in K then either every L formula is
in K or the negation of B is not in K;
Semantic completeness: Every well-formed L formula that is logically valid
is a K theorem (and its theoremhood formally provable within a first-order
calculus using only explicitly given logical axioms and rules of inference);
Syntactic incompleteness: If K contains Peano arithmetic and is recur-
sively axiomatised, then either (i) there exists a well-formed L formula such
that neither this formula nor its negation is in K, or (ii) every well-formed
L formula is in K;
Semi-decidability: If there is an L formula that is not in K then there is
no mechanical or recursive algorithm for determining whether an arbitrary
L formula is or is not a K theorem; if however the set of Go¨del numbers
associated with the formulas in κ (and L) is recursive, then there exists a
mechanical / recursive test that confirms that B (an arbitrary K theorem)
is indeed a theorem.
Before examining the question of whether this metatheory can be made precise
in the indicated manner, I make some additional comments on the symbolism and
terminology used below. A reader who is not interested in pedantic distinctions
should be able to skip this subsection without loosing essential details.
1.1. A note on symbolism and terminology. For brevity, I use a primitive no-
tion of ’expressing a proposition’ throughout this paper, though it should be clear
that this idea can be made precise in a thoroughly orthodox (Tarskian) way. For
example, if under the intended interpretation of some first-order language, the bi-
nary predicate ’A21’ is assigned the relation of equality, and the individual constants
’a1’, ’a2’ are assigned respectively to the individuals a, b, then the proposition that
a equals b is expressed in this language (under this interpretation) by the formula
’A21(a1, a2)’. In the discussion below, the notion of a first-order language and an ar-
bitrary first-order theory are used in the sense indicated above; that is, the notions
are used in an orthodox / formalist sense that corresponds to the usage of, for exam-
ple, [6]. In the following discussion it is important to avoid confusion between use
of a formula (under some interpretation) and mention of the formula (viewed as an
uninterpreted sequence of signs). Similarly, it is important to distinguish metathe-
oretical expressions from expressions of some object language under discussion. To
reduced the risk of confusion I always rely on the intelligence of the reader, though I
sometimes also use quotation symbols or corners for quasi-quotation. To illustrate,
suppose that ’B(x1)’, is used in a context as a metalinguistic name for an object
language expression ’(x1 = x1)’. Then p(∀x1)B(x1)q is a metalinguistic name for
the object language expression ’(∀x1)(x1 = x1)’, while ’B(0)’ names ’0 = 0’.
2. Expressing the metatheory in a first-order theory of domains
The question at hand is whether the informal semantic metatheory of an arbi-
trary first-order theory K is expressed in a model of some first-order theory that
has a proper axiom (schema) corresponding essentially to a set-theoretic axiom
(schema) of subsets (or subclasses). To be more precise, I consider below whether
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the metatheory might be ’expressed under a T -model M’ of such a theory in the
following sense.
Definition 2. Let T be a first-order theory in language L with (primitive or defined)
predicates ’D(x)’ and ’U(x, y)’. The semantic metatheory of first-order logic is
’expressed under the T -model M’ iff (for M a model of T ):
A: D(x) is true under M (or satisfied under an assignment s∗ of objects in
the domain D of M to L terms) if and only if: the object assigned to the L
term x - under M or at the assignment s∗ (i.e. (x)M or s∗(x) respectively)
- is the domain of an interpretation of some first-order language;
B: Similarly, U(x, y) is true under M (or satisfied at an assignment s∗) if
and only if: D(x) is true under M (or satisfied at s∗) and the object (y)M
(or s∗(y)) is an object in the domain (x)M (or s∗(x) respectively);
C: Every L formula that is an instance of the following schema is a T theorem
(where B(z) is any first-order condition on z, c.f. [3]):
(2.1) D(x) ⇒ (∃y){D(y) ∧ (∀z)[U(y, z) ⇔ (U(x, z) ∧ B(z))]}
D: There exist well-formed L formulas B1, . . ., B5 such that (under M): (1)
B1, . . ., B5 (respectively) express the five key metatheoretical propositions
concerning an arbitrary first-order theory K (mentioned at Proposition 1);
and (2) B1, . . ., B5 are all true under M.
To illustrate Definition 2, suppose that the metatheory of first-order logic is
expressed under a model M of ZFC set theory in which the individuals are sets and
the symbol for the membership relation is assigned to this relation itself (defined on
this domain); then if domains are sets, the metatheory would clearly be expressed
under this ZFC-modelM. (The illustration tacitly assumes, per impossible by most
accounts, that there exists a set of all sets.) The main result of this section may
now be stated as follows.
Proposition 2. If the metatheory of first-order logic is expressed under the T -
model M (in the sense of Definition 2), then the domain D of M contains an object
E that is a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself.
Proof. For the proof of Proposition 2 I note that, by Definition 2, T includes
formulas which, under the intended interpretationM, quantify over every domain of
interpretation of any first-order language. Since L, the language of T , is a first-order
language, the assumed Tarskian semantics ([6]:§2.2) thus imply that the domain
D of M contains every such domain of interpretation of any first-order language
(including of course D itself). Let s then be a denumerable sequence of elements of
D such that s∗(x1), the first element of s, is D. Choosing pD(z) ∧ ¬[U(z, z)]q for
B(z), 2.1 yields:
(2.2) |=M D(x1) ⇒ (∃y){D(y) ∧ (∀z)[U(y, z) ⇔ (U(x1, z) ∧D(z) ∧ ¬{U(z, z)})]}
2.1 implies that the consequent of 2.2 is satisfied at s; that is, there exists a sequence
s′ which differs from s in at most the the jth place (taking y to be xj without loss
of generality) which satisfies the consequent of 2.2. (To avoid any clash of variables,
we may if necessary take ’xj ’ to be the least L variable that does not occur in 2.2,
substitute ’xj ’ for all occurrences of y bound by the existential quantifier at the
start of the consequent of 2.2 and focus on the formula that thus results.) Let
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E then be the object s′∗(xj) in D. By hypothesis we have that the following is
satisfied at s′:
(2.3) D(xj) ∧ (∀z)[U(xj , z) ⇔ (U(x1, z) ∧D(z) ∧ ¬{U(z, z)})]
After conjunction elimination, and instantiating z at xj , this implies that the fol-
lowing is satisfied at s′:
(2.4) U(xj , xj) ⇔ (U(x1, xj) ∧ D(xj) ∧ ¬{U(xj , xj)})
Consider then whether U(xj , xj) is or is not satisfied at s
′. The above implies that
s′ satisfies the following:
(2.5) U(xj , xj) ⇔ ¬{U(xj , xj)}
The demonstration in brief is as follows:
(1) ’Every instance of a tautology is true for any interpretation’ ([6]§2.2:VII),
hence the following is satisfied at s′:
[U(xj , xj) ⇔ (U(x1, xj) ∧ D(xj) ∧ ¬{U(xj , xj)})] ⇒(2.6)
[(U(x1, xj) ∧ D(xj)) ⇒ (U(xj , xj) ⇔ ¬{U(xj , xj)})]
(2) s′∗(xj) is, by hypothesis, an object in D such that both U(x1, xj) and D(xj)
are satisfied at s′;
(3) Thus conjunction introduction and two applications of modus ponens yield
that s′ satisfies 2.5.
In short, the hypothesis that the metatheory of first-order logic is expressed under
the T -model M implies that the domain D of M contains an object s′∗(xj) such
that U(xj , xj) is satisfied at this object if and only if it is not. 
3. Conclusions
The above result is closely related to the demonstration in [2] (Proposition 2.1)
that the metatheory of the pure predicate calculus cannot be expressed in a model
of NBG set theory. The above demonstration differs however not simply in focus-
ing on the case of an arbitrary first-order theory - [2] Proposition 2.1 might be
rewritten in such terms - but in showing that the difficulty is not essentially linked
with some weakness in the NBG distinction between proper classes and sets. The
standard solution to so called ’semantic paradoxes’, denying the existence of the
hypothesised entity ([3]: Chapter One), cannot be applied in the above case without
abandoning the claim that the metatheory in question can be made precise in the
required way. (The above paradox might be described as ’logical’, in terms of the
traditional classification, if one accepts that the key semantic concepts involved - of
an interpretation, truth under an interpretation and so on - can be made precise in
set-theoretic terms (see e.g. [5]). The paradox however challenges the idea that the
notions may be made precise in this way when the aim is to express the semantic
metatheory of first-order logic in a model of either ZFC or NBG or some equivalent
first-order set theory.)
While the result does not instill confidence in the formalist program it falls short
of a definitive refutation. A more serious objection is raised by the argument that
the correctness of classical arithmetic implies that the metatheory of the formalist
account of arithmetic is false [1]. (I note in passing that in the proof of [1] Corollary
4.2 the claim that ’the proper axioms of S and Sa2 are the same’ should read
that they ’have the same form’; the exhibited proof, with some minor elaboration
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to accommodate this point, holds.) This result, combined with the observation
that Principia’s first-order logic and arithmetic avoid such problems [1], effectively
refutes the claim that formalism provides a viable account of classical logic.
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